Video: Spring of Satori: Our Latest Threat Intel, Phish n' Ships, Big Sports Gambling | Duration: 2240s | Summary: Spring of Satori: Our Latest Threat Intel, Phish n' Ships, Big Sports Gambling | Chapters: Welcome and Introductions (126.655s), Threat Intelligence Overview (270.545s), Fake Shop Investigation (401.115s), Fake Shop Infrastructure (610.43s), Disrupting Cybercrime Operations (792.67004s), Super Bowl Findings (1091.025s), Super Bowl Threat Monitoring (1096.7s), Ticketing Fraud Ecosystem (1486.885s), Game Day Cyber Attacks (1712.84s), Game Day Cyber Threats (1785.855s), Preparing for Events (1874.77s), Concluding Cybersecurity Insights (1946.525s), Conclusion and Thanks (2022.67s)
Transcript for "Spring of Satori: Our Latest Threat Intel, Phish n' Ships, Big Sports Gambling":
Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Spring of Satori Deep Dive with the Satori Threat Intelligence Team. I'm Lindsey Kaye and I'm Vice President of Threat Intelligence here at Human Security. Today, I'm joined by two members of the team, Gabby Surlig and Joao Santos. Gabby and Joao, can you please introduce yourselves? Oh, okay. So my name is Prasencho. I'm, started a career as a pent pentester mostly on, government and industry, like, actual factories. The next reverse engineering team here in Lisbon, where I'm located. And I've been working with human, on the threat intel side for the best two years, three years. Yeah. Something like that. Awesome. And I'm Gabi. I've, hacked the public transit system in Bucharest. I hacked my car, and now I'm hacking for human, and I'm leading the enterprise threat intelligence effort over here. Thank you so much, guys. For our audience, in case you're not familiar with the work of the Satori Threat Intelligence team, I going to give you a brief overview of what we do here. Our team is global and we have a diverse set of skills that allow us to deliver high quality threat intelligence work. We're very highly skilled in several areas. These include reverse engineering of mobile and desktop applications, discovering and analyzing open source intelligence from a wide variety of sources, including the dark web, analyzing network infrastructure to understand the scope of threat actors campaigns and the network footprint, and creating our own tools to monitor and collect intelligence. Some of the investigations the Satori team does end up in public facing reports like the ones we're going to talk to you about today. But there are many more that our team works on in conjunction with our product, research, and engineering teams here at Huen. Well, some of these aren't published externally. What I want to emphasize about all of our teams' work in reporting is that these findings that we generate through these investigations end up in our products. What we want to ensure is that we incorporate detections for the new threats that we identify and the campaigns we track into our track into our products to make them even better protecting our customers. This is part of the Satori advantage that humans customers get when they use our products. How exactly do we do threat intelligence here at Human? Our team supports investigations for both our enterprise and media customers, identifying new bot based and ad fraud related threats. Gabby and Joao, I would love if both of you could give a brief overview of how we do threat intelligence from your perspectives. Some would say that, the best defense is a good offense. And in our case, it's knowledge of that offense. We constantly monitor the dark web. We see what's going on, and we, proactively try to anticipate the threats and up our defenses wherever we we feel that, there's some kind of, improvement to be made. Yeah. Although Gabby's team has the cooler name than mine, enterprise, that sound a little bit cooler. But, we do essentially more or less the same thing. Our our side of the team, we focus more on threat actors on the media landscape. So anyone who's benefiting from any fraud schemes and stuff like that. So yeah. Oh, always, like, with the hacker mindset essentially. Yeah. Sure. Thank you both you guys both. So if our audience has any questions about any of our media or enterprise threat intelligence work, please put them in the Q and A part of platform and we will hopefully get to them later. But in this session, we're gonna first cover our investigation into fish and chips. Then we're going to talk about the work that our team did to prep for the twenty twenty five Super Bowl and some of the findings we have from it. We're going to start with fish and chips. This campaign was uncovered by Satori and it was centered on fake online shops and thousands of hacked hosting sites that abuse digital payment providers in order to steal consumers' money and credit card information. We've dubbed this campaign Fish and Chips to drive home the main goal of the scheme. What happens is the victim will see an advertisement for a product that seems almost too good to be true when they search for an in demand item they want to buy. Then when they click on the link, they're redirected to another website that's controlled by the threat actor. If they go to purchase the item, they're met with the real third party payment provider payment portal, unbeknownst to the payment provider, then the victim inputs their card data and personal information and they hit purchase. But as you might have expected, they never actually received the item they paid for. In terms of impact, we saw fairly substantial effects in a number of areas since the campaign first started in 2019. The threat actors invented more than 1,000 websites to create and promote fake product listings and built 121 fake web stores to trick consumers. Researchers estimate losses of tens of millions of dollars over the past five years, with hundreds of thousands of consumers victimized. I am so grateful that today we have the lead researcher on this investigation, Gabby, and he'll be talking to us about our campaign. So first, Gabby, I'd love to hear about how you actually found these fake online shops behind the Fish and Chips campaign. So tell us what you saw that made you question these shops, and think of something suspicious that was going on with them. So we at Human, we constantly, like, go spellanking for, for new attacks. We monitor the Internet for threats. And while looking for for, anything new that pops up, we encountered this operation that turned out bigger and scarier the more light we shone onto it. Then we're gonna get into, more details, as we go on. I think it would also be really helpful, we are talking about some of these fake shops that look suspicious to you. I think it'd be really helpful for our audience to be able to see what this looks like. I'm hoping you can take us through what an actual victim would see when they're presented with one of these fake shops and really how that whole scheme worked at a high level. I've got a bit of a show and tell for you. As you can see right here, the victim just performed the search for the desired product. In this case, because I'm such a nerd, I was just looking for a power meet, which is an an open glove shaped like a Nintendo Power Glove. And at one point, I I discovered an offer too good to be true, on a website that had nothing in common with any kind of, like, nerd paraphernalia. And once I I clicked it, I ended up being redirected to a domain that had nothing in common to the original domain where I clicked. And this started, like, triggering all of my fighter senses. And lo and behold, as soon as I clicked on, I I went a bit more, more and more inconsistencies popped up. Like, for example, all of these reviews were literally from the day when I just trying to make the purchase. Like, oh, man. There's so many people trying to buy, like, Nintendo Overmeets. This is insane. I I should, like, dig a bit more into this one. So lo and behold, I started going around the Internet, trying to figure out what's up with these domains. A lot more people, are kinda caught up with what's going on. A lot more reported that it's a scam. And they're like, oh, maybe it's just a couple of domains that are doing this. But no. It was a whole network out there. And all of them were prompting you, to put your credit card details into a fake shop for an item that you really, really, really wanted, which at the end of the day would cause you to, lose both the item, your money, because you don't get anything back, and, your credit card details would end up on some kind of, dark web forms to be sold around and transaction in bulk. Right. Thank you, Gabby. And part of the scheme that you actually mentioned was there are some hosting sites for these fake products in addition to the actual fake shops. So were both of these parties in on it? Were one of them a victim as well? So how does that all work? There are two different types of sites. There are unsuspecting victims that would be used as a launchpad for search engine optimization poisoning, and the infrastructure under the tackle control. And I will show you in a minute what I mean by that. So if you can take a look at the screen, you can see that, this is what you would see in your favorite search engine. Some advertisements for dopamine detox, forty five percent off, Nagin for sale, a drippy plush for sale, up 55% off. A lot of them don't make any kind of sense, and I even found, like, industrial control systems that would go for tens of thousands of dollars being sold for $50 at the discount, and it also came in men and women t shirt sizes. So, this hints at, at, a very highly distributed, operation. And the way that the attackers would do this, they would, go around, they would look find the top trends, like, search trends, and then they would compromise unsuspecting victims. Right? As we can see right here, Nasit.org, this is a legitimate website. The other one in the middle, it's an obstetric genealogy clinic. Again, completely legitimate, but it was being compromised by the attackers. And the search engines would actually not see the obstetric and genealogy Clinic, but all they but they would see these, let's call them advertisements being injected into a hidden portion of the website, which any search engine prioritizes versus the other content of that website, because this is how search engines work. And once you click them, you would be redirected to, an attacker controlled, website that had all of these, fake reviews and where you would literally use your credit card whenever you are trying to pay. Thanks, Yappy. So what's very clear is that there seem to be so many different pieces and parts and, you know, the payment providers and, you know, the unsuspecting victims and all this infrastructure that's kind of floating around. So there really was this wide footprint that was established over the course of the, you know, five years that this campaign was operating. But, you know, we saw that it managed to fly into the radar for so long. Can you give us any idea of how the threat actors change their TTPs in order to evade the detection and what they made it harder for defenders to mitigate them? First thing first, they leverage the reputation of real businesses for their own benefit. They weren't just registering fake companies out there. They were compromising legitimate businesses with a good standing reputation. The more reputable the business was, the better the attackers would fare. And this makes it very hard for search engines to block as they risk blocking legitimate users and legitimate businesses. Furthermore, they combine automatic infection and deployment with handcrafted from stores. So once you are taken to actually pay, for the fake product, the payment would be done through a legitimate business. Let's say, semi legitimate business because they would combine, let's call it synthetic traffic, synthetic bid for products that they would get from all of these fake shops with one or two operations, like one or two purchases for their legitimate products on their actual, front store that the payment processor would see. So the search engine would see a legitimate, business. The payment processor would see, a legitimate front store, but in the middle in the middle be dragons. You there was a lot of, like, glue that would tie everything together and and fake, content. They also externalize the risk. Any expiry young hacker can buy the kit and deploy his own operation. And they have a very complex tech stack, which would make it blanket ban very hard. They have multiple programming languages into with this into which this was written. So it was pretty shifty. They they they were, like, constantly evolving. And in addition to that, all of the products that they were selling, they had a very low price point. They pinch a dollar from a million purses. Right? And they become millionaires overnight. People are actually act already accustomed to stack scams on the Internet. And to be honest, for a few couple of dollars, not a lot bothered for, like, a chargeback or a DDIC. So it seems like they have kind of a lot of stuff going for them to the complex tech stack, the externalizing risk, really kind of a volume their TTPs to be really over time. But I know that Human did a lot to mitigate this threat. I was hoping you could explain to our audience, where did Human disrupt fish and chips overall? We coordinated the industry wide effort. It involves search engine providers, payment providers, and we demonetized them from both ends. First, there was no more content flowing in, no more users to scam flowing in. And second, they couldn't pull any kind of money out because once we got in contact we we in touch with the payment providers and they knew what to look for, they wiped them clean just like that. Locked their funds and left them, empty handed at the end of the day. Awesome. Thank you. I'm so glad that you brought up demonetization because that's such an important element of so many of these Satori investigations. So if we cut off threat actors ways to make money while protecting our customers, that's definitely a huge success in, aiming towards disruption of the threat actors campaign. So I just wanted to know if you had any final recommendations for our viewers. So, obviously, this is a very widespread threat that targeted, you know, innocent victims just looking to buy stuff online that they wanted for a good deal. So can you recommend anything for our audience today to protect themselves against a threat like fish and chips? First thing first, e commerce platforms and business owners should always be aware of their cyber hygiene. This includes the full stack of protection from protecting against traditional cyber threats to protecting against more insidious ones. Like, for example, post login attacks, or generally speaking, any kind of automation that might be hitting their endpoints. Because this is how this happened. They were automating the registration of the fake domains. They're automating, the registration, the the infection, and they were using a lot of hand labor hand labor, but manual labor in building those legitimate front stores, that, were tricking the payment processors into actually, registering an account with them and and and pay, making payments. On the other hand, consumer should always keep a keen eye keen eye. If it's too good to be true, then most likely it's a total scam. That's a great tip. Thank you. With that, we're actually going to switch gears a little bit here. Now we're going to talk a little bit about our Super Bowl findings. We're only a few months after the big game, but Super Bowl fifty nine kept many of us glued to our TVs. So whether we wanna see the Chiefs play the Eagles, watch the halftime show, or just enjoy the commercials, we all know a lot of prep goes into putting on an event of this magnitude. So for the teams, performers, and staff for numerous organizations involved to make it a success, but what you probably don't know is that the Satori team preps for the Super Bowl as well. So for the past two years, we've monitored dark web activity leading up to the Super Bowl to understand what the threat landscape looks like and how we might expect to see, you know, threat actors behave on game day, what type of thing customers and products. So during the event, we actually collected data to see what attacks threat actors actually attempted. So today, we're gonna talk a little bit about our process for pregame prep and what we saw threat actors do during the actual game and share insights. Alright, Gabby and Joao. So can each of you tell me a little bit about what sources you monitor before kickoff? What are you looking for to best understand the ways that actors will target organizations during the game, and where are you looking for the data? I will kick it off, and I will do another show and tell. As I said, we constantly monitor the dark web. I will show you a picture, and bear with me. Bear with me, please. Because once you understand what's going on, it is the best way to explain the data that we aggregate. So right here, what you can see, is a chart. A chart that has two axis. On y, we have the the sold count, the number of accounts that were being sold on a specific platform. And on the x axis, we have the price. How much those, you would pay for one of those accounts. Right? Because the search landscape is so varied, I had to do them the nerdy way in a logarithmic scale. And you can see right here, accounts we over here, we have, like, one account, then we have 10 accounts, and then we have a hundred accounts for sale. And on the x axis, the price would be $10, a hundred dollars, and a thousand dollars that is at the far end. And inside those bubbles, you can see the amount of cash that gets locked behind that specific account. And you can see we've got a couple of waves. So we've got over here to the bottom right corner, we've got an account that has more than $6,000 on a platform that we monitor, against the, what like, against the platform, a very popular betting platform. And this means that there's more than $6,000 that would be, at the end of the day, claimed by a user would be defrauded in this case. Then we've got a lot of, like, single time purchases for, like, accounts that have hundreds of dollars, maybe a thousand dollars. And in the top left, corner, we've got hundreds of accounts with tens of hundreds of dollars of, let's say, platform credit, that go for for peanuts for just a couple of dollars. But the attackers, you know, buy them like a box of chocolates. You never know what you're gonna get at the end of the day, after you unwrap all of those accounts and, and you see what's going on. So we constantly monitor multiple threat, like, multiple dark web platforms, and we keep an eye on what's going on. Who is buying? Who is selling? Who should we protect against? Is this a big problem, or is it just noise, and we should just discard it? Thanks, Yavi. Over you, Joao. Yeah. On our side, we you also see, a little bit more traffic and more interest by the bad actors on this, on these high high interest events. Let's call it that way. They're very consistent year over year. We don't think that the actors really care if the Chiefs or the Eagles or whoever is playing. Internet has no borders, so, these groups, mostly aren't even US based. So what they see is an opportunity to to make money. A lot of, money is moving around during this type of events. People are focused on the big game, so this is a big opportunity for them. They come up with various schemes, like, for, fishing and for, like, what Gabby just said account takeover, but also to push advertising or to push interest on on their product. People are looking for pirated video streams. They're looking for apps. They're looking to bet. So there's a lot of interest on the actors to also push their, their product, their malicious products into into the view. And as we know, there's a lot of money on also getting, putting whatever brand in the halftime show. So there's also the similar thing happening in the dark web where people are posting and sharing, services to increase your viewers, increase your posts, increase your followers. So they can also take a bite out of the, you know, the the big event and also get a little bit more popularity, a little more more traffic. And some of them tend to use some of these illegal ways, these large button has to drive this track, to fake it, to push them themselves in front of the queue. So, yeah, we see, again, this a little bit of uptick in the traffic and in the chatter in in the dark web when it becomes these events. Yeah. Thank you, Joao. And I'm so glad that you brought up the idea of, like, making money and a wide wide variety of and diversity of different types of cyber threats that we see around, the Super Bowl, at least kind of is our example here today. One thing that I was hoping, Gabby, that you could talk a little bit about. So if the goal is to make money, obviously, we we see things like account data for sale. So we also probably see some particular organizations targeted. So can you tell us a little bit about, you know, what kinds of organizations are threat actors targeting? We know that it's a wide variety. Are the trends that you actually saw on game day and the targets that you expected to see, were they ones that you had predicted beforehand? Yes. I can say that most of, the platforms that are being targeted are ticketing platforms and betting platforms because that's where the money is at. Everybody rushes to get, like, that cool ticket for the Super Bowl. Everybody places their bets, and we see a lot of attack pre and post, Super Bowl. Now when it comes to, what's being transaction, it's a whole ecosystem. Kinda like financial fraud. Right? They are lagging define behind financial fraud, as in it's no longer like a one man operation. It's a whole ecosystem. People are selling combo lists. Combo lists are, combinations of username, passwords that attacker will just try to to, until they, they will just try on the pages login platform until they actually get lucky and get access, to a a user over there. Then people selling compromised accounts, like the one that bought the companies after they run them and they find some compromised accounts, they repost them on, dark web platforms in order to cash in and get a a a return on investment on those companies they bought. And then people are selling tools that do all of that. They call them configs. They call them all in one and so on and so forth. So there's there's always, like, a lot of activity, a lot of hassle. Everybody's buying, everybody's selling. And activity picks up before a season, and we see a spike afterward, and it does it dies down as the season ends. And around the Super Bowl, I can say for sure that there are no more accounts left to buy, compromised accounts just before Super Bowl. So if you're, an upstart hacker, you should, definitely prepare before the, event. Otherwise, you'll be empty handed. So that's some great insight into, what you saw this year. But, Joao, I know you guys looked at the trends last year. So can you talk about some of the account data trends you saw last year? What changed and what remained the same? Most of it remains the same, I guess. These are big interest events. They are scheduled. They everybody knows what they're getting into. As Gabby just mentioned, not only are the users, people's folks are getting their accounts ready, preloading them with money and try and, you know, have everything ready even from the snacks to computer, everything set up to watch the game, but the attackers are doing exactly the same. So we see, them, buying and selling these tools. We see them testing these tools, and this is a great interest for our our team. So this is the whole thing we focus a lot on is, what what is the new tech that the bad guys are using right now? Are they using LLMs now to push scam messages? Are they using a new technique to, hide their bots? Where are they getting these, infections? Where are they getting the the the the residential proxies to to conduct these attacks? So, it's very important for our team to also keep an eye not only on the accounts, but also the tools and resources these actors, these actors, actors use. Because most likely, they will use it again in the future, not only for another big event like, Super Bowl, but, you know, just for day to day fraud, I guess, to, you know. So it's important for us to keep updated on the on the new techniques. It's good for our team to also keep, a tab on the market and try to understand what is the latest and greatest that the threat actors are using. Thank you, Joao. So we talked a lot about kind of the preparation for the big game. And you talked a little bit about, you know, while we were laying out our snacks, threat actors are actually getting ready to, you know, start doing their cyber attacks. So, Gabby, Joao, what do we see on game day this year? So on game day, we literally saw, like, a 300% increase, in in some spikes as to, the regular traffic. And you can see right here how we're seeing more and more activity that is dying down. And, this was for both scraping, which is the green line, and for account takeover, which is the blue line down below. People always have an increased interest, so attackers always have an increased interest as well. So thank you. And I know that, both of you have done a little bit of work looking to boss bot based attack trends in general. What are some of those trends and then how does what we saw during the Super Bowl fifty nine actually reflect those? On the game day, like, as I described, we've got a lot of ATO. And during the game day, if you focus exactly on the game day, based on the traffic that's going on on the platforms we monitor, you can literally see Kendrick Lamar starting playing right about here. And as I said, great interest from regular people also bring a lot of interest, from the dark web. So, we, we can see, like, whoever has prepared day one, like, early bird always get the gets the one. Awesome. And anything you'd like to add, Joao? Yeah. We see the same on the media side. So there's a lot of more interest in the click and view bots are trying to get other folks, reactions to the game or the halftime show. So a lot of these folks already have these bots ready to inflate their views and to, you know, drive more traffic into it. And, we see also ways, essential more, traffic on the residential proxy network. So, we know that the attackers are using not only to do follower bots or click bots or something like that, but also for the accounts that Gavin mentioned and, all of the the the the roots force in the scraping that these accounts do as well. Okay. Thank you so much. What can you both recommend that organizations do ahead of these types of big events? Not everyone might worry about the Super Bowl, but every organization probably has their big events that keep them up at night. So for example, Black Friday certainly comes to mind. So, Joao, I'll start with you. Well, should follow the lead of, our threat actors. We should, prepare. We should make sure that our infrastructure is ready, not only for the legitimate traffic from the inflow from, legitimate users, but also be aware of threats. Make sure that our bot bot bot detection tools, that, there are no attack factors exposed on your services, and that your users are are protected. It's, it's important also to get these things ready, have a checklist. A lot of companies do this not only for, big event like Super Bowl, but, like, releases of big products and stuff like that. We don't want scalpers or, other actors to, influence badly influence the experience of the user. So, we should follow, what the attackers are doing and prepare ourselves for the events as well. Thank you, Joao. And over to you, Gabby. You should always keep an eye on the dark web. There is a lot of actionable intelligence that can prepare you for any upcoming attacks. And the second thing, keep an the other eye on your own customer's funds. Attackers will target well accounts just after the game concludes and before, the actual humans, get the chance to cash in their wins. This way, you can completely protect your platform. Thank you both, and thank you for such amazing insights over the course of this webinar. I have two final questions. Since we're coming up on time here, what are some of the last thoughts you want to share with our viewers on the bot threat landscape, as well as the ad fraud threat landscape, both of what we're seeing, what we expect to see continue? So we're seeing the same pattern all year over year over year, and we do not expect them to go away as more and more people are moving their real life habits to the cyber, world one. So this rate is not going away. Buckle up. Prepare for the worst because the digital world, will get only bigger and bigger. Thank you, Gabby. Joao? Don't click any suspicious looking links. Don't install any malicious applications. If the deal is too good to be true, it probably is. Or if it's free, then you are the product. That's that's a couple of really good rules for pretty much, not only for Swipe Security, but a lot of things in life. But but, yeah, the the the attackers are getting trickier and smarter and with the help of LLM, the things, that they push, Stinson, the more real and more legitimate. So you need to be extra careful with that too. Okay. Thank you, Joao. Final question for both of you. If you had to pick one thing that organizations can do to better combat bot threats or ad fraud, what would it be? Don't underestimate them. A lot of the attackers are young and reckless, and this makes it a very asymmetric battlefield. Leave it to the pros and invest in a state of the art bot mitigation solution. Thank you. Here. Here. Thank you so much both of you and thank you for taking the time, and thank you all to our audience for, coming to our session today. So I believe we are out of time, but thank you so much and see you next time.